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Abstract
In this paper we introduce new expert-coded measures of regime legitimation strategies for 179 countries in
the world from 1900 up until 2018 that are comparable across time and space. Country experts have rated
the extent to which the government promotes or references its performance, the person of the leader, rational-
legality, and ideology in order to justify the regime in place. With regards to ideology, the experts are further
asked to categorize the ideology of the regime as nationalist, communist/socialist, conservative/restorative,
religious, and/or separatist. The main purpose of this paper is to describe and validate the data against
expectations on claims from case studies as well as with existing regime type classifications. We show that
experts do understand and can be employed to code legitimation claims. Not only do we document historical
shifts in legitimation claims, but the measures also pick up recent trends, such as, an increased emphasis
of the leader in countries such as Russia, Turkey, Cambodia over the last decades, and more recently also
in India and the Philippines; as well as recent increases in legitimation claims based on both conservative
and nationalist ideologies the European countries Serbia, Hungary and Poland, which also have experienced
autocratization in recent years.
1 Introduction
Governments routinely make claims that provide justification for why they are entitled to rule. These claims
legitimate the rules, both formal and informal, on who holds authority, how they can exercise it, and to what
ends, and thereby empower rulers to exercise authority, i.e. make collectively binding decisions. Different
claims to legitimacy have ramifications for how a country functions (Burnell 2006), as well as the nature of
the relationship between the state and its citizens (Weber [1922] 1978).
This paper introduces new expert-coded measures of regime legitimation strategies for 179 countries in the
world from 1900 up until 2018. Sophisticated methods for the selection and aggregation of expert-coded data
from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project ensure the comparability of observations across time and
space. Country experts have rated the extent to which the government promotes or references its performance,
the person of the leader, rational-legality, and ideology in order to justify the regime in place. The item on
ideology asked the experts to further categorize the ideology of the regime as nationalist, communist/socialist,
conservative/restorative, religious, and/or separatist. Expanding on von Soest and Grauvogel (2017a, 2017b),
our data is the first to capture legitimation claims across time, and for all regime types. The temporal
aspect allows not only for tracking trends, but crucially for analyzing what happens following changes in
legitimation claims or what happens with legitimation claims when other aspects of rule are transformed. By
also measuring claims put forward by democratic regimes we are able to for the first-time document when
changes from procedural to identity-based claims, such as the person of the leader or the ideology occur
which may coincide with autocratization.
2 The Concept of Legitimacy and Legitimation
Legitimacy is one of the most crucial, yet also most contested concepts in political science (Barker 2001;
Beetham 1991; Gilley 2009; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Lipset 1959; Rigby and Fehér 1982; Weatherford
1992). It goes back to the political writings of Sallust on the conspiracy of Catiline in which he develops the
idea of an imperium legitimum. From its etymological beginnings, legitimate rule was explicitly delineated
from tyrannical rule. Legitimacy originally referred to a form of political rule is conducted in accordance
with the law. Legitimate rule is supposed to be free of arbitrariness and despotism . As such, legitimacy
occupies a key position in democratic theory as well as normative state philosophy. Legitimate rule refers
here to how a good political order should look like, carrying semantics that range from fair, right, just, free,
appropriate, proper, to acceptable and voluntarily consensual.
In contrast to this rich normative tradition, Max Weber has set the ground for a different understanding
of legitimacy (Weber [1922] 1978). Instead of following the quest for what is a good rule, he advocated
an empirical usage of the concept. In other words, instead of asking how political rule should look, Weber
proposed we observe how political rule actually is (Collins, Randall, and others 1986). Weber’s strict empirical
usage of the term makes it possible to extend legitimacy from democratic theory to the empirical study of
both democratic and autocratic regimes.
It fits both because it is interested in understanding the sources of obedience to authority irrespective of the
means by which that authority is constituted:
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In addition every such system attempts to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. . . What is
important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant
degree and according to its type treated as “valid”; that this fact confirms the position of the
persons claiming authority and that helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise (Weber
[1922] 1978, 213-4).
We adopt this Weberian notion of legitimacy and use the term in an explicit empirical-analytical way. In line
with the passage above, we argue that behind every political order there is a “legitimacy idea” (Kielmansegg
1971) that constitutes the major narrative of why a ruler is justified to rule, no matter if the regime is
democratic or autocratic. The “legitimacy idea” captures the reason why a ruler is (or feels) entitled to
rule and what this purported right to rule actually entails. Simultaneously, legitimacy refers not only to the
claims of rulers, but their reception by the ruled. Thus legitimation in Weberian sense is a two-stage process
that entails the ruler’s articulation of set of claims to justify that rule and their acceptance by those under
that rule. Only when the ruler’s claim is congruent with the belief of the ruled, we can meaningfully speak
of legitimate rule. Legitimation is therefore always a relational concept that connects a dominant A to a
subordinate B. It is a relationship in which subordinate B sees the entitlement claim of dominant A as being
justified and follows dominant A due to a perceived obligation to obey (Gerschewski 2018, 653–55).
Famously, Max Weber distinguished in his work between three forms of legitimate rule – rational-legal,
charismatic, and traditional. Rational-legal is based “. . . on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Charismatic rests “. . . on devotion
to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” And traditional is grounded “on an established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them” (Weber [1922]
1978, 1:215). Weber’s concepts are ideal-typical. They are not descriptive, but analytic accentuations of one
or more features of reality. They are drawn in pure and abstract terms, so that they can be compared to
an empirical reality as tools of measurement that allow us to judge the extent to which certain principles
or mechanisms are present in any concrete social or political formation [Weber ([1904] 1949), 89-91). As
such, the types of legitimacy, while they are logically distinct concepts designed to measure, are not logically
exclusive in reality. In fact, we would expect any real-world system of authority to combine some elements of
more than one form of legitimation. We would also expect the ways in which different regimes legitimate
their rule to overlap to some extent, even if they trend to greater similarity in-type than across- type.
Rational-legal authority is based on the existence of an extensive, binding, and consistent set of laws which
regulate the conduct of authority. Under systems of legal authority, rule is by officials following a highly-
specified, precise, set of rules (the law). Only the top rung of the hierarchy are not officials in a pure sense.
Those exercising supreme domination in a legal form of authority are usually selected by special means such
as election (democracy or oligarchy), appropriation (seizing power), or succession (monarchy). Though even
their authority is usually subject to constraint by the law. In a pure type of legal authority, the selected
rulers oversee a bureaucratic administrative staff who see to the rational adjudication of the law.
Traditional authority is based on age-old, sanctified practices. The rulers in such systems are appointed on
the basis of established customs (primogeniture, tournament, election by small collegial bodies) and obeyed
on the basis of this status. Obedience is usually based on a common upbringing that stresses the importance
of customary practices and adherence to them. They are often embedded in the natural cycle of life, religious
practice, and communal/social life and organization, or all three. The administrative staff in such a system
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is composed of personal retainers. Subordinates are loyal to the ruler, (and in contrast to rational-legal
officialdom – not to a set of externally established impersonal rules). Subordinates follow the commands of
traditional authorities because they correspond to his/her status as an authority, or if they fall into a sphere
in which tradition grants authority a free hand.
Charismatic authority is based on the extraordinary, supernatural or exceptional qualities of an individual
leader. Such leaders share an intense personal bond with a devoted following that believes in their extraordinary
qualities. Because of this they have a powerful say in the shape of the social formations over which they
preside. Weber attributes the power to “reveal” or “ordain”, “normative patterns” and/or “order” to them
(Weber [1922] 1978, 215-6). In addition, charismatic domination is a response to extraordinary circumstances,
such as profound disillusionment with or a crisis in the existing state of affairs. Second, as a response to such
conditions, it is revolutionary in nature. Finally, it is inherently unstable and short-lived in its pure form.
Any failure that calls the extraordinary nature of leadership into account will weaken it, and if successful,
over time it will come to be routinized, in the direction of the other two forms of legitimacy. It eventually
will be traditionalized or rationalized.
While there are certain affinities between forms of legitimacy and certain regimes, there is no direct corre-
spondence. Anyone familiar with contemporary democracy will immediately recognize the centrality of the
legal-rational type as essential to common understandings of democratic practice. But even in democracy
we can see a routinized element of charisma in the popular election of leaders who control rational-legal
officialdom. It has been inverted and subjected to legal regulation. Instead of followers recognizing their
responsibility to follow extraordinary leaders, a sovereign people select the leader most fit to lead through
laws promulgated to achieve that end (Berhard 1999).
Curiously, the same two types of legitimacy – rational-legal and charismatic – may well be central to authority
in a harshly authoritarian regime. Jowitt (1983) makes such a claim for Leninism, though the degree of
both types and how they combine are radically different from democracy. In general, with regard to both
charismatic (at least in its pure non-routinized forms) and traditional legitimacy, it is hard to imagine
democratic rule that is based largely or exclusively on either. Though one could imagine how certain elements
residually embedded from earlier forms of rule could play a small role (e.g. monarchs as heads of state).
Generally speaking, as the dominant form of legitimation, both are much more conducive to the legitimation
of authoritarianism.
2.1 Beyond Weber
David Beetham (1991) has formulated a critique of Weber’s typology of legitimate rule. Beetham argued
that Weber collapsed several dimensions into one typology, thereby overloading it. Instead, he proposes to
keep separate at least three dimensions: legality, justifiability, and the explicit expression of consent. Legality
refers to the observation that a political order cannot be ruled against the existing laws, but need to be in
accordance with them. As such, legality speaks directly to the etymological origin of the concept of legitimacy.
Secondly, justifiability refers to the need to go beyond the legal sphere. A legitimate order needs to anchor
its legitimacy claim in a widely shared narrative, be it a national myth, a shared history, a political ideology,
or any other kind of identity-creating source. A legitimate order needs social cement that binds the people
together. Thirdly, Beetham argues that legitimacy needs to be explicitly conferred, be it in the form of
mass rallies, elections, or even swearing an oath. What we can learn from Beetham’s intervention is that an
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empirical study of legitimacy needs to address to what extent the legitimacy belief has been condensed into
legal form, to what extent the claim and the belief can be justified in the first place, and to what extent this
is explicitly transferred to the public sphere.
Beyond the Weberian tradition, a second important empirical understanding of legitimacy stems from David
Easton (1965; 1975). His systems theory approach is also normatively neutral and therefore well-suited for
an application across the democracy-autocracy divide. In a nutshell, Easton’s idea of a political system is
system of interaction in which values are authoritatively allocated. Two forms of input, demands and support,
need to be transformed into outputs which again have repercussions via feedback effects on the inputs. It
is particularly Easton’s discussion of support that is of relevance here. Easton distinguished between two
modes of support: the diffuse and the specific. Diffuse support refers to “evaluations of what an object is or
represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does” (Easton 1975, 444). Diffuse
support is therefore independent of the daily input, but refers a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good
will” that is able to help members to “accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed” (Easton 1965,
273). As such, diffuse support is more long-term oriented, identity-related, and often entails a full-fledged
political ideology, be it in the form of a thin ideology like nationalism or a thick one like communism (Freeden
1998). In contrast, specific support is a short-term evaluation of the performance of the political system,
a “quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands” (Easton 1965, 268). It is based on a cost-benefit calculus.
If the incumbent rulers deliver, the population will support them in the short term. If the rulers fail to do
so, support is withdrawn. Specific support is therefore an utilitarian updating in light of ruler performance.
Fritz Scharpf (1999) has more recently taken up this idea and has developed it into his dualism of “input”
and “output” legitimacy with the former referring more to ideational and the latter more to interest-based
sources of legitimacy.
There is some disagreement as to whether what Easton sees as specific support or what others have more
recently called performance legitimacy (White (1986); Hechter (2009); Zhao (2009); Soest and Grauvogel
(2017a)) should be called legitimacy. From a Weberian perspective, legitimacy must entail more than
obedience on the basis of material or coercive incentives or sanctions:
Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic
grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest. Or people may submit
from individual weakness or helplessness because there is not acceptable alternative (Weber [1922]
1978, 214).
Some scholars have moved beyond Weber’s caveat and have argued that discourses that pledge the basic
satisfaction of human material needs or even more elaborate socio-economic compacts between the ruler and
ruled constitute a viable base for legitimation (Gehlen 1963; Cook 1993; Lake 2009). Skeptics point out that
such accounts conflate the difference between support and legitimacy. Because the use of material or coercive
means to secure compliance to authority is highly contingent on renewed application of sanctions or rewards,
the critics would see distinctions between obedience on this basis and on the basis of legitimacy (Bernhard
1993, 26–27; Gerschewski 2013, 2018). Such criticism would not however take issue with the idea that poor
government performance can weaken legitimacy (Lipset 1959; Juan Jose 1978), only that it cannot substitute
for a credible set of beliefs, even though it can undermine it. In order to facilitate the empirical study of this
conceptual controversy, we have collected data on the performance-based justification of authority.
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3 The V-Dem Legitimation Survey
On the basis of these theoretical considerations, we have compiled a list of five questions that mirror the
most important legitimacy claims. Our aim is to capture only the legitimacy claims of the rulers and not the
question of legitimacy beliefs of the people.1 As outlined, a form of rule’s claim to legitimacy regularly rests
on different components. It can be more identity-, process- or output-based (Soest and Grauvogel 2017a)
but these claims are not mutually exclusive and are often invoked in parallel (e.g. Alagappa (1995)). Based
on the central conceptualizations of Weber and Easton, we selected four expert questions that focus on a
government’s legitimation strategies in respect its rational-legal rule, the person of the leader, its political
ideology and its performance to comprehensively capture claims to legitimacy. The experts furthermore
categorized the content of a government’s ideology. The questions are presented in Table 1 below. The regime
is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their
exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries,
and top civil servants.
To capture Weber’s legal-rational type, we ask: “To what extent does the current government refer to the
legal norms and regulations in order to justify the rule of the regime in place?” We also include a question on
charismatic legitimation: “To what extent is [the leader] portrayed as being endowed with an extraordinary
personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic,
moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?” We did not directly ask
about traditional rule in a Weberian sense, but use a part of our question about dominant political ideology to
proxy for it. We posed the following question to our country expert coders: “To what extent does the current
government promote a specific ideology (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of
social, political, and economic relations) or social model (for example socialism, nationalism, modernization,
religious traditionalism, etc.) in order enhance the legitimacy of the regime in place?” The content of the
political ideology is then put forward in a separate, multiple choice question. We give five different possibilities:
nationalism, socialist or communist, conservative or restorative, separatist or autonomous, and religious. In
so doing, we believe to cover the most important types of political ideologies. As we show below, Weber’s
traditional rule can be inferred from the conservative/restorative and/or the religious answer. Lastly, we
tackle performance legitimation by posing the following question: “To what extent does the government refer
to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, good government, and/or providing
security) in order to justify the rule of the regime in place?”
3.1 V-Dem’s Methodology
Our five legitimation items were included in one of V-Dem’s sub-questionnaires and are all coded by country
experts. The five questions and response scales were detailed about in Table 1. With the exception Ideology
Character, the expert’s rating for all four items and country years are entered into V-Dem’s measurement
model which converts expert scores into an interval latent variables. This is a Bayesian item response
theory model that estimates country-year point estimates on the basis of the expert codings. Patterns of
coder dis/agreement are used to estimate variations in reliability and systematic differences in thresholds
between ordinal response categories, in order to adjust the point estimates of the latent concept. To achieve
1A prior expert survey examined a similar set of claims to legitimacy questions (Soest and Grauvogel 2017a, 2017b)
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Table 1: The V-Dem Legitimation Battery
Question (variable name)
Performance (v2exl_legitperf)
To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction,
effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?
Rational-legal (v2exl_legitratio)
To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in
place?
Leader (v2exl_legitlead)
To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with an extraordinary personal characteristics and/or
leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other
extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?
Ideology (v2exl_legitideol)
To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of
beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example socialism, nationalism,
religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?
Response options: 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.
Ideology character (v2exl_legitideolcr)
How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?
0: Nationalist (v2exl_legitideolcr_0)
1: Socialist or communist. (v2exl_legitideolcr_1)
2: Restorative or conservative. (v2exl_legitideolcr_2)
3: Separatist or autonomist. (v2exl_legitideolcr_3)
4: Religious. (v2exl_legitideolcr_4)
Response options: 0: No. 1: Yes.
cross-national and temporal comparability, V-Dem’s approach is to use both lateral coders that code several
countries for a shorter time period, and bridge coders that code the full time series for more than one country,
as well as anchoring vignettes that integrate information on coder thresholds into the model (for a more
detailed description of how this is done see Coppedge et al. (2019), and for the measurement model see
Pemstein et al. (2018)). The vignettes employed for the legitimation battery are included in the appendix.
3.2 Number of experts
The mean number of expert coders ranges from 4.69 to 4.72 for the legitimation variables over the 119 years
for which we have data, totaling 18,604 country years. In general, there are fewer experts further back in
time; the mean number of expert coders per country and year rises from 4.23 in the year 1900 to 5.5 in 2018.
A full accounting of the number of coders for each variable and country year are available in the appendix
(see Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16). There are a number of notable countries that unfortunately were not coded
by the requisite number of experts in the 2019 update (v.9), e.g. Iraq (1920-2018), China (1900-2018), and
Greece (1900-2015). Hopefully these lacunae can be fixed during the next scheduled update of the data set.
The data included in the V-Dem v.9 dataset does not include country-years with less than 3 expert coders.
For explorative purposes, the full data including observations with less than 3 expert coders, can be requested
from the authors, however it is strongly recommended to rerun any analysis excluding these observations with
less than 3 coders as a robustness check. In this paper, we include in China and Laos in Figure 9 displaying
the legitimation trends in communist regimes. While China and Laos only have 2 to 3 coders depending
on year, the face validity of the measure is not too bad with regards to the importance of ideology. Albeit
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in China, the person of the leader clearly lacks face validity. Not only would we expect to clearly detect
Mao Zedong (in power 1949-76), we would also have expected an uptick in leadership-based claims following
President Xi Jinping’s assent to power in late 2012 given his moves to personalize power (Shirk 2018).
4 Data Validation
In this section we explore the data for the four different legitimation claims and the variation in the ideological
character of those claims. We begin by examining different claims to legitimacy at the aggregate level. Figure
1 shows the distribution of claims for all available country years, including horizontal bar plots, indicating
the mean and standard deviation. It shows that we have data points spanning the full spectrum for each
claim and that the mean for Ideology, and the Leader is around the middle of the scale (at 2.03 and 2.04),
and the distribution for Performance and Rational-legal is slightly skewed to the right with a mean at 2.14
and 2.08. The figure provides a reference going forward with the data exploration.
Ideology Leader Performance Rational−legal
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
Extent of claim
Figure 1: Distribution of Legitimation Claims
Do different regime types have different propensities to rely on the four different types of claims to legitimacy
we have measured? Using the Regimes of World typology from V-Dem Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg
(2018)] figure 2 below plots the degree to which closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral and liberal
democracies rely on different legitimation claims from 1900 to the present. Our expectation is that autocracies
should be more dependent on ideological and leadership-based claims, whereas democracies should be focused
on rational-legal and performance criteria to justify authority. By and large the data is in line with this
expectation.
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Ideology Leader Performance Rational−legal
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
Closed 
Autocracy
Electoral 
Autocracy
Electoral 
Democracy
Liberal 
Democracy
Extent of claim
Figure 2: Distribution of Claims by Regime Type (Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018)
Beginning with ideological claims, both closed and electoral autocracies rely more heavily on these sorts of
claims to justify their rule, than the two democratic regime types. Among democracies, electoral democracies
exhibit a greater propensity to utilize ideological rationales than liberal democracies. There are a number of
liberal democracies that are exceptional in this regard. For instance, from 2004 to 2016 Israel relied heavily on
the personal authority of its rulers, a period which was characterized by the domineering leadership of prime
ministers such as Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu. Another exception in this regard is South Africa
under the presidency of Nelson Mandela. His role as the charismatic leader of the anti-Apartheid movement
and its first democratic elected president gave him strong credibility as a transformational leader. The picture
with regards to claims based on performance and rational-legal exhibit, in line with our expectation, the
reverse relationship. Closed autocracies, in particular, do not rely on these sorts of claims to a high extent,
whereas electoral autocracies, with their emulation of democratic procedures, rely on them to a greater extent,
but not as extensively as democracy (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). The other aspect that is quite interesting
with regard to electoral authoritarianism is that it combines all four claims in large measure. With regard to
personalistic-leader-based and ideological claims, it ranks just a bit lower than closed autocracies, yet its
level of reliance on performance and rational legal claims is just a bit lower than the democracies it emulates
to generate legitimacy (Schedler 2009).
In the next figure, 3, we compare the ways in which military, monarchic, party and personalist autocracies
seek to legitimize their rule. This categorization is drawn from the typology and coding proposed by Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014). While we find less variation between different forms of autocracy compared
to figure 2, there are some clear differences. As one would expect, dominant-party based regimes (a high
percentage of which are Leninist) rely on ideology to a larger extent than do other autocratic regimes. Again,
there are some outliers but they do not cast doubt on the descriptive inference we present above. For instance,
Ivory Coast under the rule of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire – African Democratic Rally (PDCI)
from independence up until 1999 was not very ideological (Piccolino 2018, 502). Legitimation in this case was
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highly personalistic, based on the charisma of the leader of the independence struggle Félix Houphouët-Boigny
who ruled until his death in 1993. His style of leadership was known as “Houphouetism” and towards the
end of his reign his followers referred to him either as “Papa” Houphouët or “The Old One,” cementing his
reputation as the “father of the nation” (Toungara 1990)
Military regimes do not promote the qualities of the leader to the same extent as the three other types, all
of which have similar higher values. On average, monarchies rely on this claim to the greatest extent and
with the most consistency, as demonstrated by the very low variance on the mean. Somewhat surprisingly,
party-based and personalistic regimes promote the leader to a similar degree. However, this may a product
of the fact that we use the distinct categories in the data, and did not use the hybrid types in the data.
This may be due to the fact that in revolutionary and post-revolutionary regime-building stage one-party
regimes strongly rely on cults of charismatic leadership (e.g., Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China, Castro’s Cuba,
or Kim’s Korea, or the example of Ivory Coast discussed above as exemplary one-party big-man rule in
post-independence Africa).
With regard to performance legitimacy monarchies rely on such claims to a lesser extent. While personalistic
dictatorship relies on such claims less than military or one-party rule, we were surprised that the levels
between these three were similar. It is possible that under such regimes neo-patrimonial distribution of
resources is seen as a kind of performance, which can used to claim the legitimacy to rule. Such arguments
would make sense in the context of big-man rule in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Médard 1992;
Erdmann and Engel 2007).
Ideology Leader Performance Rational−legal
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
Military
Monarchy
Party
Personal
Extent of claim
Figure 3: Distribution of Claims by Autocratic Regime Type (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014)
Breaking down legitimation claims by the regime categorization proposed by Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius
(2013) offer some nuance with regards to differences between one-party and multi-party regimes (see figure 4).
As expected, One-party regimes rely to a greater extent on ideology than any other regime type, and rely on
the person of the leader more than do multiparty authoritarian regimes. While indistinguishable in terms of
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performance claims, one-party dictatorship, on average, relies somewhat less on rational-legal claims than do
their multi-party cousins.
Ideology Leader Performance Rational−legal
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
Democracy
Military
Monarchy
Multiparty
One party
Extent of claim
Figure 4: Distribution of Claims by Autocratic Regime Type and Democracy (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius
2013)
4.1 Legitimation Claims and Level of Democracy
The scatter diagrams in figure 5 plot the four legitimation claims against V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy
Index (EDI) for a cross-section of all countries in the V-Dem dataset in 2018. Including all country years the
correlation between the claims and the EDI are: Ideology -0.33, Leader -0.42, Performance 0.44, Rational-legal
0.52. This reiterates the pattern of associations already visible in the previous plots, but also highlights that
the four legitimation measures are not mere proxy measures of democracy. They carry additional information.
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Figure 5: Relationship between Claims and Democracy: 2018
4.2 Face Validity Checks
We explore the validity of our measures looking at selected individual countries over time to see if the values
generated by the expert surveys are congruent with what is generally known about the development of each
country. If we start by looking at legitimacy claims based on the personalistic characteristics of the ruler,
the short dotted blue line in figure 4, we can clearly identify the rise of strongmen. In line with the recent
literature on the personalization of the Cambodian regime (see Morgenbesser (2018)). The measure picks up
Hun Sen’s ascension to the premiership in Cambodia in 1985 and notes a peak in person-based legitimation
claims in 2018, when he audaciously commissioned a grand and ostentatious monument to himself (Nachemson
2018). We also see an uptick in India after the 2014 electoral success of Hindu-nationalist Narendra Modi
and an even sharper rise in the Philippines after notorious strongman Rodrigo Duterte was elected president.
His personalistic claims to legitimacy has begun to approach that of the previous notorious egoist-in-chief of
the island nation, Ferdinand Marcos (1965-86). In Thailand, we see a sharp rise in leader-based claims since
the coup-mastermind General Prayuth Chan-o-cha assumed dictatorial power in 2014. In Turkey we see a
dramatic increase in personalistic legitimation claims since Recep Erdogan assumed the premiership in 2003.
These increased even further after he became president in 2014. And even more striking, the intensity of
claims based on Erdogan’s persona now surpasses those of the founder of the republic and its first president,
Kemal Attatürk (in power 1923-38). In the US we note a small, yet significant increase in claims based on
the person of the leader since Trump’s inauguration in 2017, which is now on par with that of the wartime
president Franklin D. Roosevelt (in power 1933-45).
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Figure 6: The Rise of Strongmen
We see similar surges in personalist legitimacy claims in the two Central European EU members, Poland and
Hungary, that have experienced recent bouts of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). In Russia,
the government has steadily elevated Putin’s persona and is approaching levels close to Stalin’s “cult of
personality”. In Serbia we note the dramatic fluctuation in claims based on the appeal of Josip Tito (in power
1953-80), Slobodan Milošević (in power 1989-97), a rise again since after the Serbian Progressive Party’s
Tomislav Nikolić won the presidency and entered power in 2012. The high level of personalist legitimacy
claims has since continued since Aleksandar Vučić assumed the presidency in 2017. In addition, we also
observe an increase in legitimacy claims based on ideology, in particular nationalism, in all four countries (see
appendix figure 12).
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Figure 7: European Backsliders
In line with expectations, the highest level of reliance on the person of the leader is seen in absolute monarchies,
such as Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Oman (see figure 8). Monarchy, by its
nature, heavily relies on the person of the leader in staking its claim to the legitimacy of the regime. And as
is evident from the North Korean timeline, see figure 9, things truly reach true heights on this score when the
regime is the “socialism in one family” practiced by the Kim dynasty in North Korea.
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Figure 8: Kingdoms Promote the Person of the Leader
The five self-proclaimed communist states in the world also all heavily rely on ideology to justify their rule
(see figure 9). In the case of Cuba, the drop off at the end is a product of the retirement of charismatic
revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro, and the transfer of power to his brother Raul in 2011, and then again
after Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed the presidency in 2018.Taken together the graphs in this section largely
square with our expectations and offer us further confidence that expert coders can be employed to estimate
legitimation claims over time.
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Figure 9: Communist Regimes Promote Ideology
4.3 Different Types of Ideology
In addition to asking the country experts “To what extent does the current government promote a specific
ideology [. . . ] in order enhance the legitimacy of the regime in place”, we also ask about the character of that
ideology. Specifically; “How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?”,
giving the coder the option to signify whether any of the five types of ideology were present (1 = yes, 0 =
no): Nationalist; Socialist or communist; Restorative or conservative; Separatist or autonomist; Religious.
These answers are then aggregated via averaging, taking on values between 0 [No] and 1 [Yes]. These are not
mutually exclusive as a government may well promote, for example, both religion and nationalism in order to
justify the regime, which, for example, is the case in both democratic Israel and autocratic Iran. In order to
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make the different types of ideology claim comparable to, for example personalistic claims, we simply assign
the full value form the Ideology claim variable to each ideology type that half, or more, of the experts agreed
was present, allowing a regime to claim legitimacy based on more than one ideology character.[An alternative
approach, which is suitable for comparing the different ideology types to each other, would be to weigh the
ideology measure with by the mean of each ideology character coding.] To illustrate, out of the 9 coders for
Russia in 2018, 6 reported that the ideology was nationalist, 6 that it was restorative or conservative, and
1 coder reported that the ideology was socialist or communist. In this case we assign the full value from
the ideology claim question (in this case 2.8) to both nationalist and restorative or conservative but not to
socialist or communist. If we look at the average level of specific ideologies in regions during specific time
periods in figure 10, we see certain patterns which we would expect given what we know about history. For
instance, in Africa and Asia we see increases rise in nationalism after decolonization. In Eastern Europe,
as expected, we see sharp rise in Socialist and Communist ideology following World War II, and then its
collapse at the end of the Cold War. We see a similar pattern in Africa when Chinese and Russian influence
was widespread during the Cold War and its diminution with the collapse of European communism.
Figure 11 breaks down the distributions of Ideology character by regime types and gives us further confidence
that the coders have managed to capture differences between the type of ideology promoted. For example,
democracies, if anything, promote nationalism and a conservative or restorative ideology. One-party regimes,
more often than not, promote a socialist or communist ideology. Military regimes promote nationalism more
than do other types, and among the monarchies, most promote a conservative or restorative ideology to a
high extent.
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Figure 10: Ideology Claims by Character and World Region
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Figure 11: Ideology Claims by Character and Regime Type (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013)
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the Regime Legitimation Strategies (RLS) measure, providing for the
first-time measures of governments claims to the right to rule that are comparable across time and space,
that are freely available for 179 countries and 119 years. We have shown how claims to legitimacy based
on; Ideology; the person of the Leader; Performance; and Rational-legal norms and regulations vary across
regimes, and within countries over time. From the validation exercise in section X, it is evident that experts
do understand and can be employed to code legitimation claims: with very few exceptions their coding square
well with expectations from case studies as well as with existing regime type classifications. In addition to
capturing historical shifts the measures pick up recent trends, such as, an increased emphasis of the leader
in countries such as Russia, Turkey, Cambodia, and more recently also in India and the Philippines; and
recent increases in legitimation claims based on both a conservative and nationalist ideologies the European
countries Serbia, Hungary and Poland, which have also experienced autocratization. These measures are,
for example, of interest to scholars of autocratic politics; regime survival; nationalism; and autocratization
among others.
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Appendix
Question battery (including vignettes)
Legitimation introduction
Clarification: Governments make legitimacy claims – provide justifications for the form of rule under which
they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the
sitting government. Please note that the government’s claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies -
are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of
their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in
multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies.
The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders
and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet,
ministries, and top civil servants.
Performance legitimation (v2exl_legitperf)
Question: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth,
poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the
regime in place?
Responses: 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important
component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.
Vignettes: 0-1 The economy in Country X has fluctuated in the recent decade, and although the government
takes credit for improvements when the economy is improving, they seldom connect the economic situation of
the country to the political regime.
1-2 The incumbent government in Country X often claims that their policies are more conducive for economic
growth and lead to lower rates of unemployment, and that the proposed platform of the opposition would
set the country on course to recession. However, the incumbent does not describe the opposition as an
illegitimate alternative because of this, nor suggest that the existing rules for leadership selection be set aside
in order to secure continued economic progress.
2-3 Country X has had a turbulent history of civil unrest and a previous regime that was overthrown, following
allegations of grand corruption. The current political leadership and state-owned news media often portray
the current government a bulwark to civil conflict, and as doing their best at cleaning up a corrupt political
system and bureaucracy.
3-4 Country X has seen sustained economic growth and widespread poverty reduction in the previous two
decades. State owned media frequently attribute the rise in living standards to the stability of the political
system and government policies. The government in Country X routinely dismisses calls for political reforms
by referring to the absence of economic development and widespread corruption in a neighboring country
since it introduced multi-party elections ten years ago, as a contrast to the successful and stable development
of country X.
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Rational-legal legitimation (v2exl_legitratio)
Question: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to
justify the regime in place?
Clarification: This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution
regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may
score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.
Responses: 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important
component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.
Vignettes: 0-1 Country X does not hold competitive elections and the rules governing access to political
power are not made transparent in Country X. Yet the government may proclaim that they have gained office
through intra-party rules and regulations.
1-2 While the military government in Country X came to power through violent means, the junta often
portray themselves as the only guarantors of rule of law, and the only one who can uphold a predictable
climate for businesses to operate.
2-3 The president in Country X was elected by popular vote in an election tainted by accusations of widespread
voter fraud in benefit of the incumbent. The key opposition leaders have called for new elections to be held,
but these calls have been dismissed by the national election committee. The president proclaims that he is
democratically elected, by a majority the people of Country X, and as such is the rightful ruler of the country
for the upcoming 4 years.
3-4 Country X is a highly democratic country where freedom of expression and liberal principles are respected,
and where horizontal accountability is institutionalized. The government clearly derive their right to rule
from the electoral process and rules based on the procedures laid out in the constitution.
Person of the Leader (v2exl_legitlead)
Question: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with an extraordinary personal
characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral,
pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?
Clarification: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on
the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.
Responses: 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important
component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.
Vignettes:
0-1 The president of Country X dresses indistinguishably from the rest of his cabinet. Save for a stellar
academic record, little is publicized about the president’s life and extraordinary personal achievements before
ascending to the top political position of the country.
1-2 The government in Country X often makes a point of the president’s excellent leadership in stewarding the
country through the ongoing economic crisis, but at the same time also give credit to the finance minister’s
work on managing the budget.
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2-3 The president of Country X makes frequent media appearances in which he addresses the nation population
as his family. Government communication promotes his capabilities as a skilled international negotiator
and an excellent military commander. However, the life and political accomplishments of political leaders,
including the president are not taught in school in Country X.
3-4 History books in Country X typically devote more than one chapter to the early life and political
accomplishments of the country’s president, one of which include swimming across a raging river at age 60.
The portrait of the president hangs in every school classroom and public building throughout the country.
The philosophy and political thought of the president is mandatory teaching in the education system of
Country X.
Ideology (v2exl_legitideol)
Question: To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an
officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for
example socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?
Responses: 0: Not at all. 1: To a small extent. 2: To some extent but it is not the most important
component. 3: To a large extent but not exclusively. 4: Almost exclusively.
Vignettes 0-1 Country X ensures freedom of expression and religion both de-jure and de-facto. In school
liberalism is promoted as the foundation of Country X.
1-2 The government in Country X often preaches the virtues of Christian values and promote themselves as
realizing the core interest of the Nation of Country X, which they proclaim is under threat from globalization,
immigration and international businesses. The president recently stated that by the mandate of the people
of Country X, he is obliged to close the boarders to immigrants who do not share Country X’s values and
traditions.
2-3 Islam is the official religion in Country X. Throughout the modern history of Country X, all political
leaders have portrayed themselves as devout Sunni Muslims, who frequently claim that political decisions are
made in order to safeguard the standing of their religion in the region. While freedom of religion is enshrined
in Country X’s constitution there are only a few followers of different faith traditions, and none of whom are
central in the state apparatus.
3-4 Communism is the official ideology of Country X. Marxist and Leninist teachings are compulsory
throughout the educational system and are featured in university entry exams. Most public spaces are
decorated with banners and posters carrying ideological slogans promoting communism and egalitarian values.
Ideology character (v2exl_legitideolcr)
Question: How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?
Clarification: Check all that apply.
Responses:
0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes)[v2exl_legitideolcr_0]
1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr_1]
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2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr_2]
3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr_3]
4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr_4]
Additional validity checks
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Figure 12: European backsliders - Ideology
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Zimbabwe
Zanzibar
Zambia
Yemen
Venezuela
Vanuatu
Uzbekistan
Uruguay
United States of America
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
Ukraine
Uganda
Turkmenistan
Turkey
Tunisia
Trinidad and Tobago
Togo
Timor−Leste
The Gambia
Thailand
Tanzania
Tajikistan
Taiwan
Syria
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Figure 14: Number of Coders for Leader
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Number of coders - Performance
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Libya
Liberia
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Zimbabwe
Zanzibar
Zambia
Yemen
Venezuela
Vanuatu
Uzbekistan
Uruguay
United States of America
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
Ukraine
Uganda
Turkmenistan
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Togo
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Figure 15: Number of Coders for Performance
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Number of coders - Rational-legal
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Zimbabwe
Zanzibar
Zambia
Yemen
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Vanuatu
Uzbekistan
Uruguay
United States of America
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Figure 16: Number of Coders for Rational-legal
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